either a tax treaty or a TIEA. Under the IGAs, it is the responsibility of the foreign government to collect the necessary information from its banks and transmit it to the IRS. In return, under some IGAs the US has agreed to do the same for the foreign government, i.e., collect information on its residents who have accounts in US banks and share it with the foreign government. The difference, of course, is that the US is the only country that taxes its citizens living overseas, so it has many more taxpayers with accounts in foreign financial institutions than the foreign country is likely to have in US banks.
It is not clear that the IGAs are permitted under FATCA, since the legislation clearly requires direct submission of the information by the FFIs to the IRS. Nor is it clear that Treasury had the authority to enter into IGAs under the tax treaties and TIEAs. 7 But the main concern about the IGAs is that they enshrine the bilateral model of tax information exchange that has dominated the 20th century. Unfortunately, there are good reasons to believe this bilateral model does not work, especially when IGAs are signed with countries like the Cayman Islands 8 who have no interest in reciprocity and every interest in making them not work.
Instead, there is an alternative. In response to the financial crisis and the outrage it caused in Europe about tax evasion by the wealthy, the OECD has proposed a Multilateral Agreement for Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 9 (MAATM), which has by now over [75] 10 signatory countries. The MAATM provides for automatic exchange of information and because it is multilateral it overcomes the problem of nonreciprocity that bedevils the tax treaties, bilateral TIEAs, and the IGAs.
In what follows, we will argue that the MAATM model is superior, and that therefore the US and OECD should abandon tax information exchange and administrative assistance under articles 26 and 27 of the tax treaties, as well as bilateral TIEAs and IGAs, and instead commit to the MAATM.
Tax Evasion
As technology has evolved dramatically in recent years, it is easier today more than ever for both companies and individuals to shift income and capital among countries 7 Christians, Allison, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why it Matters) (February 11, 2013 15 Avi-Yonah, supra note, 13 at 3. 16 The OECD recognized that a country that does not provide information about its taxpayers is also a tax haven. 17 See http://www.taxjustice.net.
18 Avi-Yonah, supra note, 13 at 13. corporations in tax havens and channeling the income to these foreign companies, results in an estimated $70 billion a year deficit to the U.S. treasury 19 .
Lack of information
As the world become borderless, countries are faced with problems enforcing their local tax laws. As a result, tax evasion has become a central concern of the major economies around the world 20 . Hand in hand with the double taxation convention, the global finance system has developed agreements for the exchange of information in order to increase the ability of their tax systems (both civil and criminal) to enforce their rules on sophisticated taxpayers 21 . A primary goal set by the OECD in the last decades is the war against countries whose lack of transparency allows them to function as a comfortable place to route income, without enabling other countries to track this income. 22 .
A report released by Avi-Yonah, "The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report:
A 10th Anniversary Retrospective" 23 indicates that the OECD has achieved significant progress in the field of information exchange over the last decade. However, lack of transparency is still a major problem in the global field. In our opinion, as long as some countries continue to provide tax shelters to taxpayers, the OECD may win the battle but will lose the war, resulting in the need for an alternative solution. Our opinion is based on two factors: First, the assumption that in a competitive financial world, some countries will always be willing to host trillions of dollars in order to achieve investment in their infrastructure. The second factor is sophisticated internal law, such as exists in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) 24 . As of 2010, the BVI population stood at 29,537. However, more than 400,000 companies were incorporated under BVI law. Though the lack of transparency is still a major problem, in our opinion the ability to track unreported income is increasing under those agreements, due to the countries' option to track the source of the income. In the event of income "disappearing" without reporting it to the suitable tax authority (or to any authority at all), a flag should be raised.
Based on our assumption, we will briefly review the existing bilateral treaties and Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) of the U.S. and the OECD.
With the above problem in mind, the U.S. started signing TIEAs with countries around the world 27 . In order to create a wide network of information exchange, the U.S.
has over 60 bilateral treaties that include articles dealing with the exchange of information. These treaties usually allow exchange of both civil and criminal http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-021-002.html ("The U.S. has over 60 bilateral tax treaties with other countries, and over 20 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA) in effect with various countries and jurisdictions where a bilateral tax treaty is not in place. These treaties and agreements facilitate the exchange of information, and generally allow for mutual assistance for both civil and criminal investigations. The tax treaties allow for information exchange by specific request, and in most cases, through spontaneous and automatic exchanges as well"). 29 Id. The war against offshore tax evasion is far from ending. However, it seems that today more than ever, a U.S. taxpayer will think twice before using an offshore jurisdiction in order to avoid taxes, so as not to risk the potential of sanctions arising from the cooperation of foreign banks or jurisdictions with the IRS. For example, after the UBS case, the UBS agreed in 2009 to disclose about 4,450 American clients suspected of using the bank's offshore services to evade taxes 42 .
Assistance in the Collection of Taxes
As the world becomes global, tax collection is becoming more complex. Even if a country has determined the right to tax liabilities of its taxpayers, collection can be a difficult task. In the event that a taxpayer is devoid of any assets in the country that is trying to make the collection, very limited solutions are available to that country. Any attempt to collect taxes through another country will be considered a violation of the other country's territory 43 .
Assistance in the collection of taxes has a long history in international and American law. In 1955, in the case of India V. Taylor 44 , the government of India sought taxes from a company registered in the United Kingdom, but trading in India. The House of Lords held that India cannot enforce its collection of taxes through a British court.
"My own opinion is that there is a well-recognized rule, which has been enforced for at least 200 years or thereabouts, under which these courts will not collect the taxes of foreign States for the benefit of the sovereigns of those foreign States; and this is one of those actions which these courts will not entertain." Therefore, the U.S tried to enforce the judgment against the respondent in a Canadian court, claiming that this was a contract that the Canadian court was required to enforce.
The supreme court of Canada held that no Canadian court would enforce the revenue laws of another country.
"Similarly, in my opinion, the argument that the claim asserted is simply for the performance of an agreement, made for good consideration, to pay a stated sum of money must also fail. We are concerned not with form but with substance, and if it can properly be said that the respondent made an agreement it was simply an agreement to pay taxes which by the laws of the foreign state she was obligated to pay."
The non-enforcement of foreign public judgments is a taboo in law history 46 .
Although countries may enforce private judgments in fields like torts and contracts, when they are faced with a request to force foreign judgments in fields like criminal, antitrust and tax, the request will be denied 47 . The obvious result is a decrease in the ability of countries to enforce their laws even when public policy is not an issue.
The reasons for the aforementioned phenomenon are varied 48 . According to Johnson, Alan, and Lawrence the efforts by one country to enforce its law on public issues within the territory of another may "constitute an extraterritorial intrusion" 49 . Although international tax practice has evolved dramatically in the last decades 50 , it seems that the cooperation of countries on a voluntary basis is limited and subject to complex and uncertain processes.
Multilateral conventions for Tax Collection Assistance
Due to a historic problem of tax collection by countries within a foreign country, jurisdiction countries have began to sign mutual agreements. The model of the MAATM convention is based on a combination of tax exchange provisions and administrative assistance in the collection of taxes. Under the model, countries that have signed the convention enjoy "cross-border tax co-operation including exchange of information, multilateral simultaneous tax examinations, service of documents, and cross-border assistance in tax collection, while imposing extensive safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged" 57 . The main purpose of the convention is to create a worldwide network of countries that will, in some cases, share automatic / per request information about potential tax evasion, and in some cases collection of taxes within the foreign jurisdiction as well.
One advantage, which can also be a disadvantage, is the flexibility that the to assistance in the collection of taxes. Nevertheless, in practice the U.S. signed treaties that include an article relating to assistance in collection of taxes in a foreign country 61 .
The provisions that are related to the collection of taxes can be divided logically into two types 62 , a "General Enforcement" and a "Limited Enforcement" 63 . A "general enforcement" is general mutual assistance in the collection of taxes within a foreign country.
The "general enforcement" provision is found in treaties with Canada, Denmark, note that in the event a country files 66 a tax claim against a person's assets in another country, the latter country will enforce the claim as if the liability were in its jurisdiction.
Article 27 is a fly in the ointment; paragraph 4 sets out that "the assistance provided by the article shall not be accorded with respect to the citizens, companies, or other entities of the state to which the application is made, except when the enforcement is against a person who enjoyed the convention although he was not entitled to". There was a development of independent agreements that are more limited, as described above. As a result, the U.S entered a collection provision only where a convention was re-negotiated and assistance of tax collection provisions were included 72 .
"Limited enforcement" is assistance in collection of taxes where a person or entity enjoys the benefits provided by the treaty, even though they are not entitled. As a result, the application of the provision is narrow and limited to very specific situations, as described above 73 . A "limited enforcement" paragraph can be found under the U.S. According to paragraph 6, the "validity or the amount of a revenue claim of a Contracting State shall not be brought before the courts or administrative bodies of the other Contracting State". An interesting question is whether paragraph 6 should also apply in the case where temporary relief is provided (e.g. seizure), and whether the foreign court has the right to determine whether the request is reasonable on the strength of the evidence. A review of the CAMTC supports the hypothesis that any judicial proceeding will take place in the country that asks for assistance in the collection of taxes. 76 Van de Vijver, Anne, ed., supra note 70.
Conclusion
This paper reviewed the development of the exchange of information on tax matters and the assistance in the collection of taxes between countries. As detailed in the study, the history and the present show that countries are faced with sophisticated taxpayers who wish to reduce their income using artificial methods
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. As a result, a dual problem arises. First, due to globalization countries should locate the foreign income of their taxpayers. The problem is that taxpayers are hidden behind shell companies in some tax haven 100% of the time. Second, even when the country has managed to track the income and the beneficiary of the income, it has a problem collecting the tax if no assets are located within its jurisdiction. Consequently, over the years, countries have been attempting, both on their own and with the help of treaty models in particular, to provide a solution in the form of bilateral agreements. However, most of the current agreement are limited in their application, or too complex to carry out. In addition, in some of the agreements as described above, countries have a very limited range of operation.
As this article demonstrates, the ability to force the collection of taxes worldwide by countries is critical in today's world. However, the question remains as to whether bilateral conventions and agreements are the keys to the solution. In our opinion, in a global economic world that is growing daily, a bilateral agreement among countries may win the battle but will lose the war against tax evasion. Indeed, tremendous efforts by countries are making people to think twice today before trying to avoid tax payment.
However, when the exchange of information and the collection of tax is dependent on agreements between two countries, the possibility of detecting tax evasion by a taxpayer is very low. Even if we succeed in such a mission, locating assets in foreign countries other than the one with which the country has the agreement is not a valid option.
Based on the analysis above, We are of the opinion that the US and OECD should abandon tax information exchange and administrative assistance under articles 26 and 27 77 As described in the UBS case.
of the tax treaties, as well as bilateral TIEAs and IGAs, and instead commit to the MAATM.
Given the realities of today, adopting a multilateral model will create a worldwide network for the exchange of information, and will make it easier than ever to track suspicious transactions taking place in multi-jurisdictions. Once a country claims a tax deficiency, the locating of assets can be done in different states under a common electronic system. As a result, a smaller percentage of taxpayers will be willing to take the risk of getting caught and paying with "their own" capital and their own freedom.
